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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF STOCK BY BROKERS
Purchasing stock on margin has been, is, and probably will continue to
be a common practice in Pennsylvania. In a transaction of this nature the
buyer furnishes a portion of the purchase money, or none at all as the case
may be, and the broker through whom he purchases furnishes the balance
or all of it. The broker who uses his funds to make the purchase secures
himself by retaining the buyer's newly acquired stock until the buyer pays the
balance due plus commissions and expenses. The relationship thus establish-
ed by this retention is that of pledgor and pledgee, the customer being the
former, the broker the latter.,
In his position as pledgee the broker has the right to use the pledged
stock in certain ways without being guilty of conversion. His rights in this
regard may be summed up briefly as follows :
"One to whom stock has been pledged for a loan has full power to
hypothecate it so long as the original pledgor may obtain possession of
it upon payment of his debt; but if it has been mingled with other
securities of the pledgee, or has been rehypothecated by him to secure a
different or larger debt than that for which it was pledged to him, or if
the collaterals have been transferred, but the obligation they were given
to secure retained, or if it has in any way been placed beyond the control
of the pledgee, this is a conversion."-'
This statement is by way of dicta, it is true, but it is sufficient to indicate
some ways in which brokers can convert their customer's stock. Again our
problem is not what constitutes conversion but assuming a conversion oc-
curs, what are the respective remedies and rights of the broker and cus-
tomer?
There are. it seems, two particular problems which arise in the situation
where a broker converts his principal's stock; first, the broker's right against
the buyer to recover any balance due on the purchase price, and, second,
the buyer's right to recover damages from the broker.
Taking up the first point it is to be noted that ever since the case of
Sproul v. Sloan- Pennsylvania has held, until very recently, that the broker
by converting the stock has lost all right to recover from the customer any
balance due. In the words of the court :
"The conversion operated as a matter of law as an extinguishment
3Learock v. Paxson, 208 Pa. 602 (1904).
2Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284 (1913),
aSupra note 2.
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of the entire indebtedness of the customer for the purchase price of, the
securities converted."
In the recent case of Otis v. Medoff' the court finally concluded that its
prior ruling in Sproul u. Sloan was fallacious. The court says, inter alia.
"The cases of Sproutl . Sloan, Darr v. Fidelity Title and Trust Co..
Sterling's Estate. and Berberich's Estate, are expressly over-ruled so far
as they hold that a conversion by a broker operates as a matter of law
as an extinguishment of the entire indebtedness of the customer for the
purchase price of the securities converted."
At first glance the old rule seems more equitable than the new one. It
seems only proper that the broker should be punished for his breach of trust.
On the other hand, conversion by a brcker is a criminal offense, and thus the
broker would be punished twice for the same misdeed. The court in Otis v.
Medoff says concerning the old rule.
"It results in palpable injustice. It deprives the broker of all right
to recover even though the customer's loss may actually be only a frac-
tion of the broker's claim. It is an exception to the general rule that the
measure of damages for a wrong done is compensation for the loss sus-
tained. There is no reason, in law or equity, why an exception should
be made in this class of cases."
Indeed the only case' which attempted to give a reason for the extinguishment
of the broker's claim based its reasoning on an unnecessary and false premise;
namely. the broker having breached the contract could not demand perform-
ance. The court in Otis v. Medoff in speaking of its reasoning in Sproul v'.
Sloan says.
"This argument is fallacious. A broker's claim arises when he pur-
chases stock for a customer and advances the purchase price. Immedi-
ately upon the purchase the stock becomes the customer's property.: but
it remains in the broker's possession as security for the advances and
commissions. The relation between the parties is that of pledgor and
pledgee. If the broker makes a wrongful repledge of the stock it is un-
deniably a conversion, for which he is liable in damages, but it is not a
breach of contract to advance the price and purchase the stock, which is
the foundation of the customer's indebtedness. It is at most only a
breach of his duty as pledgee. This breach can be fully compensated
for by an off-set of the customer's damages for the conversion against
the broker's claim."
4311 Pa. 62 (1933).
-Fraudulent Conversion Act, the Act of May 18. 1917, P. L. 241; 18 P. S. 2486.
'Siupra note 2.
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This, then, brings up the second problem; the customer's right to recover
damages from the broker. Perhaps the leading case on this question is
Gervis v,. Kay.: It is true that the rule laid down in this case must be con-
fined to conversion by honest mistake. In such case the measure of damages
is the highest value of the stock between the date of the conversion and a
reasonable time after notice thereof. However, the court in an exhaustive
opinion clearly holds that the only time when the rule of Sproul v, Sloan and
Learock v. Paxson' is to be applied is when there is a deliberate breach of
trust by the broker or a failure to deliver specific stock when it is the inten-
tion of the customer and the broker that the customer is to receive such stock.
In other words, where the broker deliberately converts the buyer's stock to
protect or further his own interests at the expense of the customer's, then the
customer may recover the highest value of the stock between the date of the
conversion and the date of the trial. Hence it seems that the further implica-
tion is that inasmuch as the above rule applies only to deliberate breach of
trust then the rule of Gervis v. Kay would apply to all other cases of conver-
sion by brokers.
However this may be, all controversy is apparently eradicated by the
Act of 1929, P. L. 476. This statute, in brief, is as follows;
"In any proceedings . in which damages are claimed for the
conversion of stocks, bonds, or other like property of fluctuating value,
the damages shall be limited to the difference between the proceeds of
the conversion, or that portion thereof duly paid or credited to the own-
er, and such higher value as the property may have reached within a
reasonable time after he had notice of the conversion. Where the facts
are not in dispute this period shall be fixed by the court as a matter of
law."
Unf6rtunately. there are as yet no appellate decisions on this statute.
There are, it is true, several lower court cases,!, only one of which is directly
on the statute.-0 This case, in short, says that the Act of 1929, P. L, 476 is
the case of Gervis v. Kay codified and hence interprets the statute as making
the measure of damages the difference between the value of the stock at the
time of the conversion and the highest value it attains within a reasonable
time thereafter. The rule as stated in this case is unfortunately ambiguous.
There is a vast difference between the measure of damages when the rule is
"a reasonable time after notice of conversion" and "a reasonable time after
conversion." However, inasmuch as the case cites the statute as its author-
7294 Pa, 518 (1928).
SSupra notes 1 and 2.
oFitchthorne v. Barclay, Moore & Co., 14 D. & C. 83 (1930); Pollock's Estate, 15 D. &
C. 147 (1931).
lOCalloway v. Clucas, et al.. 16 D. & C. 453 (1932).
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ity and speaks of it as Gert'is v. Kay codified, it seems that the court must have
meant "a reasonable time after notice of the conversion."
Examining the so-called New York rule, which is the basis of the deci-
sion in Gervis u. Kay, it appears that the rule there is that the measure of
damages is the highest value of the stock between the date of the conversion
and a reasonable time after notice thereof.1 Thus it seems, with the ruling
of the courts of other jurisdictions, that Pennsylvania will interpret the Act of
1929, P. L. 476 as making the measure of damages the highest value of the
stock between the date of the conversion and a reasonable time after notice
thereof. It must be kept in mind that the statute applies to all cases of con-
version by brokers whether it be by honest mistake or deliberate fraud.
There remains but one additional matter to consider; namely, what con-
stitutes a reasonable time. By the statute such time is a matter of law when
the facts are not in dispute. Normally it means sufficient time under the cir-
cumstances (the financial ability of the customer not considered) 2 in which
the customer can go into the market and purchase additional shares of like
stock as those converted.' In one late case" the court held that under the
circumstances that normally occur a reasonable time varies from fifteen to
sixty days after notice.
In summing up. then, the law in Pennsylvania seems to be, in cases of con-
version by brokers, as follows: first, the broker is entitled to recover any balance
of the purchase price due him less the damages for the conversion.'-- Second,
"In a note in the Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 78, December issue. No. 2, the writer
states that the New York rule is that "the measure of damages is the highest value the stock
attains a reasonable time after notice, of the conversion", and not "the highest value the stock
attains between the date of the conversion and a reasonable time after notice. thereof". For
example, suppose the broker converts the stock on July 1st, and the buyer gets notice of the
conversion on July 21st. Suppose further that a reasonable time is ten days. According to
the rule as stated by this writer for New York, the buyer could recover the highest value of
the stock between July 21st and July 31st. According to the rule which he says does not
apply, the buyer could recover the highest value the stock attained between July 1st and July
31st. The writer of this article further contends that the rule in Pennsylvania is the same as
he claims is applied in New York, by force of the Act of 1929, P. L. 476. A careful exam-
ination of the New York cases will show that although this interpretation might readily be
drawn from a hasty examination of them, the rule is in fact both in New York and Pennsyl-
vania, "the measure of damages is the highest value the stock attains between the date of the
conversion and a reasonable time after notice thereof."
Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211 (1853); Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y. 25 (1880); Keller v.
Halsey, 115 N. Y. S. 564 (1909); Peschke v. Wright, 156 N. Y. S. 773 (1916); In re Dick-
inson, 157 N. Y. S. 248 (1916); Langford v. Fessendon, 203 N. Y. S. 301 (1924).
Other jurisdictions apply the New York rule as well: Galigher v. ]ones, 129 U. S. 193
(1888); Ling v. Malcom, 77 Conn. 517 (1905).
"2Ling v. Malcom, 77 Conn. 517 (1905).
13Supra notes 7 and 12.
14Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N. Y. 412 (1917).
15Supra note 4.
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the measure of damages to which the customer is entitled is the highest value
which the stock may attain between the date of the conversion and a reason-
able time after noticel" thereof.'1 Third, a reasonable time is that period in
which the customer could after notice of the conversion go into the market
and purchase like shares of stock as those converted by the broker.-0 Fourth,
this period is a question of law and hence determined by the court,1" it norm-
ally being a period of fifteen to sixty days depending upon the circum-
stances.
20-
E. M. Blumenthal.
APPEALS BY THE COMMONWEALTH IN CRIMINAL CASES
Lawyers as well as legal teachers and students undoubtedly will recog-
nize the importance of the Court's holding in the recent case of Common-
wealth v, Simpson, as to the right of the Commonwealth to appeal in criminal
cases. It marks a step forward in the protection of both personal and
property rights. Quoting from the decision-
"This is what we intended when we said in Commonwealth v. Wal-
lace, 114 Pa. 405,411, 6 Atl. 685, 687, 'For error in quashing an indict-
ment, arresting judgment after verdict of guilty, and the like, the Com-
monwealth may remove the record for review without special allowance
of the proper writ'. By the words 'and the like' we meant cases in which
the ruling is against the Commonwealth on pure questions of law. Our
determination is therefore that the Commonwealth has the right to ap-
peal."
'Notice of conversion may be actual or constructive. In other words, the customer may
acquire notice of the conversion by written or oral information from the broker or, the circum-
stances may he such that although the customer has received no actual notice he could not
have possibly been ignorant of it.
Dimock v. U. S. National Bank, 55 N. 1. L. 296 (1893); Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193
l 88); \,ayer v. Monzo, supra note 14.
17Supra note 7; Act of 1929, P. L. 476.
18Supra notes 7 and 12.
-'Supra note 7; Act of 1929, P. L. 476.
-"Supra note 14.
1310 Pa. 380, 165 Atl. 498 (1933) where the Commonwealth appealed from an order of
the lower court in overruling its demurrer to plea of former jeopardy entered by defendant to an
indictment of murder on which he was about to be tried, giving judgment for him on the plea
and discharging him from the indictment.
